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We analyze transactional data in Nubelo, a large online labor platform serving the 
Spanish-speaking markets. Our results indicate that employers favor domestic 
contractors. In our most conservative estimate, foreign workers are 15% less likely to 
obtain contracts in Nubelo compared to domestic workers. Yet this discrimination 
appears to be statistical rather than taste-based, as it decreases when more information 
about workers’ quality becomes available to employers. Further, contrary to some of the 
findings in traditional labor markets, we do not find evidence of discrimination against 
women in online hiring. In fact, women have a small hiring advantage, particularly 
among female employers. However we do observe that women are less likely to submit 
bids and tend to ask for lower wages, particularly when bargaining with male 
employers. Our findings shed light on how differentials in traditional labor markets play 









Despite overall economic growth in the past two decades, finding employment 
continues to be a major challenge for the millions of young Latin Americans who enter 
the labor market each year. This is particularly true for women. Recent data shows that 
about 1 in 3 women aged 18 to 24 are not in education, employment or training, 
compared to 13.3% for men (ECLACL/ILO, 2013). Latin American women are also 
less likely to enter the labor force, despite having closed the educational gap with men 
(IDB, 2012). More alarmingly, the rate of growth in women’s labor force participation 
has decelerated significantly in the last decade, particularly among low-income groups 
(Gasparini and Marchionni, 2015). 
 
Gender pay gaps are also persistent. This partly reflects three facts: first, Latin 
American women are overrepresented in low-wage occupations in the informal sector; 
second, they are more likely to be employed part-time; and third, they are 
disproportionately responsible for unpaid housework and child care (World Bank, 
2012). On average, Latin American men earn 17% more than women of the same age 
and level of education. Interestingly, this gender pay gap tends to rise with income 
(IDB, 2012). 
 
Recent studies suggest that the diffusion of new ICTs and the development of online 
labor markets can significantly increase employment opportunities and improve wages 
in emerging economies, particularly for women and youth. The argument is based on a 
number of stylized facts. First, the majority of employers in online labor markets are 
based in high-income countries, while the majority of contractors (employees) are based 
in middle and low-income countries (Mill, 2011). This simple fact suggests that workers 
may be able to earn higher (hourly) wages relative to opportunities in local labor 
markets. Second, many potential workers are discouraged about local job opportunities, 
opting out of markets with low wages or where available jobs do no match their skills. 
Online labor markets dramatically expand the number and range of opportunities, 
facilitating access to employers in global markets and increasing the likelihood that 
individual skills will be matched with available jobs (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 2011; 
Agrawal et al., 2015). 
 
Some studies indicate that the emergence of online labor is of particular value to women 
and the youth. For example, Rossotto et al. (2012) suggest that schedule flexibility 
enable online workers to balance freelance work with other responsibilities such as 
childcare and education. Raja et al. (2013) also suggest that, by making location 
irrelevant, online labor enables women to overcome some of the cultural barriers that 
may exist in traditional workplaces. Finally, digital labor tends to be associated with IT 
literacy. This naturally favors younger workers, who are more likely to have the skills 
and familiarity with technology required by employers. 
 
                                                        
1  The authors acknowledge the funding support received from the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC-Canada). We are grateful to Francesc Font Cot and Nicolás Araujo Müller for granting access to Nubelo 
internal data. We also thank Guillermo Cruces for his valuable comments. 
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However, other studies are more cautious about the development benefits of online 
labor. Several empirical studies indicate that workers from less-developed countries are 
at a disadvantage because online employers, facing limited information about job 
candidates, tend to favor domestic over foreign contractors, as well as contractors from 
more developed countries (Mill, 2011; Agrawal et al., 2013; Lehdonvirta et al., 2014). 
Others theorize that these platforms may exacerbate wage inequalities by further 
skewing work in favor of the most skilled and precluding entry by inexperienced 
workers (Pallais, 2014). Moreover, some note that online work may further losses in 
key rights associated with traditional employment such as health and pension benefits 
(Raja et al, 2013: OECD, 2015). Finally, facilitating part-time labor may have the 
undesirable effect of trapping women in lower-paying jobs (World Bank, 2012). 
 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the dynamics and distributional effects of 
digital labor by exploring potential discrimination against women and workers from 
less-developed countries in an online labor platform serving Latin America. The study 
is based on the analysis of internal data from Nubelo, which to our knowledge was, at 
the time of writing, the largest online labor platform targeting the Spanish-speaking 
market. We obtained records for all transactions in Nubelo over a 31-month period 
between 2012 and 2014. The dataset includes basic demographic characteristics for 
employers and contractors (employees), and extensive platform-specific information 
about contracted jobs. 
 
Our results corroborate the presence of discrimination based on worker’s country of 
origin. In our most conservative estimate, after controlling for bid amount, job category, 
and a number of observable worker’s characteristics, foreign workers are 15% less 
likely to obtain contracts in Nubelo compared to domestic workers. Yet our results also 
indicate that this discrimination results from lack of information about the distribution 
of skills among foreign workers (in other words, it is statistical rather than taste-based). 
By contrast, we do not find evidence of discrimination against women in online 
contracting. In fact, women have a small hiring advantage, particularly among female 
employers. However we do observe that women ask for lower wages, particularly when 
bargaining with male employers. We present a number of hypotheses about this gender-







2. ONLINE CONTRACT LABOR: KEY CHARACTERISTICS  
The diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is significantly 
changing how labor markets operate. Following Autor (2001), we identify three drivers 
of such change. First, search costs are significantly reduced, potentially improving 
matching between employers and employees. Second, increased information 
digitization and growing bandwidth capabilities result in more workers (particularly in 
the service sector) capable of performing their work remotely.  Third, online delivery of 
labor makes location much less relevant, freeing both employers and employees from 
the constraints of local job markets. 
 
We study the dynamics of a specific type of ICT-enabled labor market: online contract 
labor (henceforth OCL). These are digital markets in which employers offer short-term 
contracts for specific tasks that can be delivered remotely. OCL platforms differ from 
Internet job boards such as Monster.com (and its equivalent in Latin America such as 
Zonajobs.com and Boomerang.com) in which employers and employees seek each other 
to fill traditional employment positions. They are also different from online labor 
markets for short-term employment or tasks in which physical presence is required, 
such Taskrabbit.com (and its equivalent in Latin America such as Zolvers.com). Two 
characteristics thus define OCL platforms: a) short-term, task-based matching between 
freelance contractors and employers (either firms or individuals); and 2) remote labor 
delivery (i.e., no physical proximity between employer and contractor is required). 
 
In general terms, OCL platforms can be divided into two types: crowdsourcing and 
project-based. In crowdsourcing platforms such as Mechanical Turk, large tasks are 
divided into smaller units and offered at a fixed price to multiple workers willing to 
complete them. Tasks tend to require few skills, and as a result hourly wages are 
generally low.
2
 By contrast, in project-based platforms employers outsource larger 
tasks, and typically select a single contractor based on the bids received. The details of 
the bidding and selection mechanism vary slightly among different platforms. Most 
platforms are based on fixed-price bids, though some also allow for bidding based on 
hourly wages. 
 
Both types of platforms have attracted significant scholarly attention in recent years. 
Mill (2011) analyzes internal data from Freelancer.com, a large OCL with global reach. 
He finds that employers favor contractors from more developed countries, but that the 
difference tends to disappear as personal reputation in the platform increases. Similarly, 
Agrawal et al. (2013) find that the benefits of verifiable work experience are 
disproportionately large to contractors from less-developed countries. Lehdonvirta et al. 
(2014) also find a significant hiring and wage penalty against foreign contractors. 
Stanton and Thomas (2014) explore another mechanism used by contractors to signal 
quality, namely, affiliation with an intermediary outsourcing agency. They find that, on 
average, affiliated workers obtain more contracts and better wages, but the gains tend to 
disappear as employers learn about individual workers’ quality. Pallais (2014) shows 
that reputational information dramatically increases the likelihood of being hired in 
                                                        
2 Horton and Chilton (2010) found median wages in Mechanical Turk to be USD $1.38 per hour. For comparison the 
federal minimum wage for U.S. workers in 2010 was USD $7.25 per hour. 
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OCL platforms, and is particularly valuable to entre-level workers. Horton (2013) 
similarly finds that algorithmically-generated recommendations reduce information 






3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Nubelo is a leading OCL platform serving the Spanish-speaking market. The platform 
matches employers who post contracts for short-term jobs (the demand side) with 
contractors who bid for these jobs (the supply side). Job postings typically describe the 
project, the job category, the expected date of delivery, and the country location of the 
employer. The employer also specifies the type of bids that are accepted. While Nubelo 
supports both fixed-rate and hourly-rate bids, the majority of job postings (94.30%) are 
set to fixed-rate bidding. Employers select contractors based on the bid (price) as well 
as other characteristics that are visible on the contractor’s online profile. A ban on 
employer-contractor interaction prior to the selection is strictly enforced. Therefore, all 
the information upon which employers select contractors is readily available in our 
dataset. 
 
All potential contractors are required to complete a Nubelo profile, which contains basic 
characteristics such as name, country of residence, and work experience in the platform. 
In addition, contractors can opt to include other information such as a CV, a description 
about offline work experience and skills, portfolio samples, and a personal picture. 
After completing a project, the contractor receives feedback from the employer through 
a series of questions using a 5-point scale. This feedback score is also visible on the 
contractor’s online profile. 
 
We obtained records for all transactions in Nubelo for a 31-month period (March 2012 
to September 2014). They include information on the projects posted by employers as 
well as on all bids placed by contractors (both winning and unsuccessful bids). Our 
database also includes key contractor’s characteristics visible on their profiles, such as 
work experience within the platform, feedback scores, and country location. Gender 
was not included in the original dataset. We therefore assigned each contractor a gender 
based on the username or personal name provided in the profile. We were able to 
positively assign gender in 91.70% of the cases. The remainder included either 
ambiguous names or outsourcing agencies. 
 
Our database is restricted to active contractors, by which we refer to those who have 
submitted at least one bid during the 31-month study period. Our unit of observation are 
the bids made by contractors. Our full dataset includes 47,469 bids made by 10,387 
contractors for a total of 3,193 projects. We note appropriately when partial data subsets 




3.1 The geography of trade  
The impact of OCL platforms on the global distribution of labor is an open research 
question. In particular, a key question is whether employers discriminate on the basis of 
country location of prospective workers, and, if so, whether this discrimination is 
statistical (i.e., due to information uncertainty regarding worker’s quality) or purely 
taste-based. Nubelo primarily serves the Spanish-speaking market. Therefore, while 63 
                                                        
3 At the time of writing (June 2015), 1 EUR = 1.13 USD. 
12 
 
countries are represented in our database, Spain and a few large countries in Latin 
America account for the majority of contractors (Table 1).  
  
Table 1. Contractors by Country of Residence 






Spain 4,219 40.62 
Argentina 2,647 25.48 
Colombia 943 9.08 
Mexico 760 7.32 
Chile 379 3.65 
Venezuela 283 2.72 
Peru 248 2.39 
Uruguay 157 1.51 
Ecuador 89 0.86 
Guatemala 75 0.72 
Others 427 4.12 
Total 10,387 100 
Source: Authors calculations based on Nubelo data 
 
As expected, the distribution of employers by country is even more skewed in favor of 
Spain, where individuals or firms have greater incentives to seek lower-cost labor 
alternatives through OCL platforms. As Table 2 shows, almost two-thirds of employers 
reside in Spain, followed by Argentina (18.40%) and Mexico (7.10%). The share of 
projects posted follows a similar distribution: about two-thirds of projects originate in 
Spain, with the remaining third is distributed between Argentina (15.90%) and a 
number of other Latin American countries. 
 









Spain 1,032 64.58 2,081 65.13 
Argentina 294 18.40 507 15.87 
Mexico 113 7.07 267 8.36 
Colombia 68 4.26 113 3.54 
Chile 30 1.88 82 2.57 
United 
States 
10 0.63 24 0.75 
Ecuador 8 0.50 35 1.10 
Others 39 2.45 84 2.68 
Total 1,598 100 3,193 100 
 
 
      






Descriptive results show that Spanish employers tend to favor Spanish contractors. As 
shown in Table 3, Spanish contractors win a larger-than-expected share of all projects, 
though this bias seems to be small in magnitude (about 6 p.p.), and may be related to 
unobserved characteristics such as higher average skills. Yet when the sample is 
restricted to projects originated in Spain (column c), the magnitude of the bias in favor 
domestic contractors becomes significantly larger (about 18 p.p. above the share of all 
projects). Argentine contractors are hit particularly hard, since they comprise the largest 
share of non-Spanish (i.e., foreign) contractors. Yet it is worth noting that due to 
government-set limitations to international currency trade in Argentina, Nubelo requires 
that Argentine employers hire Argentine contractors. This artificially inflates the 
percentage of all projects awarded to Argentine contractors (column b), thus also 
inflating their foreign penalty with respect to Spanish contractors [(c) – (b)]. 
 
Table 3. Hiring by Country location of employers and workers 
 
Country 










(b) - (a) (c) – (b) 
Spain 40.62 46.7 64.73 6.08 18.03 
Argentina 25.48 31.05 15.43 5.57 -15.62 
Colombia 9.08 5.07 4.23 -4.01 -0.84 
Mexico 7.32 5.76 4.52 -1.56 -1.24 
Chile 3.65 1.38 1.01 -2.27 -0.37 
Venezuela 2.72 0.81 0.67 -1.91 -0.14 
Others 11.13 9.23 9.41 -1.90 0.18 
Total 100 100 100 
 
 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
In fact, when the sample is restricted to foreign (i.e., non-Spanish) contractors, the 
distribution of awarded projects is proportional to the relative share of contractors by 
country of residence, as shown in Table 4. The exception are small countries such as 
Bolivia and El Salvador, in which a small number of contractors perform 
disproportionately well. In general, the descriptive results suggests that Spanish 
employers tend to favor domestic contractors, but do not discriminate within foreign 
contractors. This may be due to the relative homogeneity of Latin America in terms of 
key variables such as language, time zone, and cultural traits, which have been found to 














Table 4. Non-Spanish Contractors: Hiring by Country of Residence 
 
Country 
% Of non-Spanish 
contractors 
% Spanish projects 
awarded 
Argentina 45.34 43.73 
Colombia 12.76 11.99 
Mexico 12.34 12.81 
Chile 4.59 2.86 
Peru 3.65 1.09 
Venezuela 3.43 1.91 
Uruguay 3.09 2.18 
Bolivia 2.22 8.58 
Cuba 2.03 2.72 
El Salvador 1.39 4.63 
Others 9.16 7.50 
Total 100 100 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
One of the most salient questions in the literature is whether OCL platforms tend to 
shift the distribution of contract work from high to middle and low-income countries. In 
order to examine this question we look at the distribution of awarded projects using the 
World Bank’s country wealth classification.
4
 As expected, labor demand is concentrated 
in high-income countries, while contractors are about evenly split between high-income 
and upper-middle income countries (Table 5). Lower-middle income countries represent 
a very small fraction of both employers and contractors in our dataset. 
 
Table 5. Employers, Contractos and Projects Awarded by Country Income 
Category 
            
 % Employers % Contractors 
High-income 
67.98 53.61 
(Spain, Chile, Uruguay, others) 
   Upper-middle income 
31.32 44.39 
(Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, others) 
   Lower-middle income 
0.70 2.00 
(Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, others) 
Total 100 100 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. Most relevant countries are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 6 shows trade flows between countries by level of income. The evidence indicates 
that two-thirds of projects originating in high-income countries are awarded to 
contractors in high-income countries, with only a third going to contractors in lower-
income countries. This by and large reflects the fact, noted above, that Spanish 
employers (who represent about two-thirds of all employers) tend to contract within 
                                                        
4 The World Bank divides countries into four categories: low income (GNI per capita of $1,045 or less), lower-
middle income ($1,046 to $4,125), upper-middle income ($4,126 to $12,746) and high income (over $12,746). 
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Spain. Interestingly, employers in lower-middle income countries tend to hire in higher-
income countries, which may reflect a scarcity of human capital available in local labor 
markets. 
 
















High income 66.30% 28.80% 4.90% 100% 
Upper-middle income 26.70% 65.40% 7.90% 100% 
Lower-middle income 26.10% 65.20% 8.70% 100% 
Notes: Excludes projects originating in Argentina because employers are required by Nubelo to hire 
local contractors. 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
Overall, contrary to the findings in other studies (e.g., Mill, 2011) as well as theoretical 
assumptions about a shifting distribution of contract labor in favor of lower-income 
countries (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2015), our results suggest a more limited flow of digital 
labor between rich and poor nations. Most projects originate in high-income countries 
and are awarded to local workers. More interestingly, employers in lower-income 
nations use OCL platforms to find talent unavailable (or priced higher) in local markets. 
In absolute terms, the vast majority of trade activity takes place within countries. While 
this may be due to the peculiarities of the platform under study (such as market 
segmentation by language and significant share of technical job categories), the findings 
suggest a more limited globalization of labor than found in previous studies. 
 
Figure 1 maps online labor trade activity in Nubelo. Lines represent bilateral trade of 
services in Nubelo (i.e., hiring in both directions). Line width and color strength grow 
proportionally to trade volume (log scale). This graphic representation corroborates that 
much of the trade takes place between Spain and lower-income countries in Latin 





Figure 1. Trade Activity by Country
 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
3.2 Prices and competition  
 
Nubelo supports trade in a broad range of job categories. Yet as Figure 2 shows, four 
job categories account for the vast majority (92%) of transactions: 1) software 
development, 2) design and multimedia, 3) writing and translation, and 4) IT services. 
Demand is thus concentrated in relatively high-skill job categories, particularly when 
compared to labor crowdsourcing platforms such as Mechanical Turk, where lower-
skills tasks (such as image identification and data entry) are most common. As 
expected, the market is tighter in the job categories that require more technical skills, 
such as software development and IT services. By contrast, competition is particularly 
intense for contracts in multimedia and design. 
 
Figure 2. Projects and Bids bye Job Category 
 
 




Differences in the intensity of competition are also observable in the average number of 
bids received by projects in each job category. As shown in Figure 3 most projects 
receive less than 50 bids, with a maximum of 144 (by definition, the minimum is 1). 
The mean is 14.70 bids per project (with a standard deviation of 17.90). 
 
Figure 3. Number of Bids per Project 
 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
As expected, lower-skills job categories such as multimedia and design, writing and 
translation, and administrative support receive significantly more bids per project than 
higher-skills categories such as software development and IT services (Table 7). 
Considering the two largest job categories in terms of demand volume (which account 
for about two-thirds of all job postings), the average project in software development 
receives 64% less bids than the average project in multimedia and design. Likewise, 
project values vary widely by job category (Table 7). As expected, the least competitive 
and higher-skills job categories command the highest prices. 
 











Multimedia and Design 44.85 
 
$ 124.90 
Writing and Translation 39.02 
 
$ 124.70 
Administrative Support 30.27 
 
$ 300.90 
Web and Mobile Development 28.61 
 
$ 303.70 
Marketing and Sales 18.00 
 
$ 205.80 







    
Notes: Price calculations exclude projects nominated in Argentine pesos (posted by Argentine employers). 





The mean price paid for a project in Nubelo is $197, but there is a large variance 
between projects priced at a few Euros up to large projects worth over $90,000 (the 
standard deviation is $692). As Figure 4 shows most projects in Nubelo are priced 
below $200 (the figure is truncated at $1,000 for easier visualization). 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Project Price (< $ 1,000.00), in EUR 
 
Notes: Price calculations exclude projects nominated in Argentine pesos (posted by Argentine employers). 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
3.3 Information and reputation mechanisms  
Nubelo offers a number of mechanisms aimed at producing verified signals about 
contractor’s quality. First, the average feedback score received by the contractor in 
previous jobs within the platform is prominently displayed in a worker’s online profile. 
This information is nonetheless of limited value to employers for two reasons. First, 
because (as Figure 5 shows), the distribution of feedback scores is highly skewed 
towards the maximum rating of 5 (the mean is 4.7, with a standard deviation of 0.61). 
This lack of variance in feedback scores is in fact typical in OCL platforms.
5
 Second, 
feedback scores are only valuable as signals for those who have already been hired in 




                                                        
5 For example, Pallais (2014) found that 83% of low-wage data entry workers in oDesk received a rating of at least 
4, while 64% received a maximum rating of 5. Similarly, Stanton and Thomas (2014) find that about 60% of workers 
in oDesk received a feedback score of 5 in their first job. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Contractor’s Feedback (5-point scale) 
 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
A second type of quality-signaling mechanisms are Nubelo-administered tests that 
certify specific skills (e.g., programming skills, foreign language proficiency, etc.). 
However, we observe that most contractors (53.50%) have never taken a test (the 
average number of tests taken is 1.1 with a standard deviation of 1.73). Workers can 
also signal stronger commitment by obtaining “premium” status in the platform, a new 
mechanism introduced by Nubelo in February 2014. Premium status confers two main 
advantages: 1) the ability to see posted projects before non-premium contractors 
(initially set at 24 hours, the exclusivity period was later extended to 48 hours); 2) the 
ability to bid for an unlimited number of projects per month (non-premium contractors 
are limited at 10 bids per month). In order to obtain premium status, contractors must 
pay a small monthly fee, currently set at $10. 
 
As Table 8 shows, the share of premium contractors out of those submitting a bid in any 
given month fluctuates between 39.20% and 58.70%. Descriptive results suggest that 
premium status offers a considerable advantage, as premium contractors consistently 
obtain over 80% of the jobs posted in Nubelo. 
 


































As discussed, previous studies suggest that verifiable work experience within OCL 
platforms is an important determinant of the likelihood of being hired, and that this 
effect is larger for contractors from less-developed countries. Because employers are 
unable to verify job experience outside the platform (or in fact obtain any other quality 
signal other than what is provided in a contractor’s online profile), the result is an 
inefficiently low level of contracts awarded to inexperienced workers (Pallais, 2014). 
 
Our descriptive results confirms these previous findings. The likelihood of being hired 
increases sharply with verified platform experience, although it levels off after six jobs, 
indicating that, after this threshold, the marginal contribution of each additional jobs is 
smaller (Figure 6). Contrary to other studies, we did not find a significant difference by 
country of origin, which suggests that verifiable experience contributes equally to the 
success odds of contractors from both high and low-income countries. 
 
Figure 6. Hiring Probability by Previous Experience in Nubelo 
 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
3.4 Gender differences  
 
Nubelo is a male-dominated market (Table 9).
6
 This is not surprising given that, unlike 
other OCL platforms, demand is concentrated in job categories more associated with 
men, such as software programming and IT services. More interesting is the fact that 
male contractors appear to be more active than female contractors, submitting a larger 
than expected share of bids. As shown, female contractors submitted an average of 3.70 
bids during the period under study, while male contractors submitted an average of 
4.60. Yet winning odds are statistically similar. Thus, male contractors win a larger than 
expected share of contracts simply by being more active (i.e., bidding more often) than 
their female counterparts. 
  
                                                        
6 The sample in this section is smaller because, as noted, gender could not be established for 859 contractors in our 
dataset (8.30% of contractors). 
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Table 9. Contractors, Total Bids and Winning Bids by Gender 
 
 





Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Female 3,580.00 0.38 13,067.00 0.32 894.00 0.31 3.70 6.84% 
Male 5,948.00 0.62 27,321.00 0.68 1,980.00 0.69 4.60 7.25% 
Total 9,528.00 1.00 40,388.00 1.00 2,874.00 1.00 4.20 7.12% 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
Another indication of a gender gap in platform activity is that men are (slightly) more 
likely to submit the first bid to a project: while male contractors submit 68% of all bids 
(Table 9), they account for 74% of all first bids. This is surprising given that female 
contractors are more likely to have premium status than male contractors (67% vs. 
61%). Recall that one the key advantages of premium status is the ability to submit bids 
within the first 24/48 hours after a project is posted. 
 
One possible explanation for these findings is that women are more active in the more 
competitive job categories. Table 10 suggests this is the case (categories are ordered by 
demand volume, measured in number of projects posted). As expected, women are 
underrepresented in software development and IT services. These categories tend to be 
less competitive as indicated by the average number of bids, thus pushing up project 
values (Table 7 above). By contrast women are overrepresented in writing/translation 
and (slightly) in multimedia and design, where competition is more intense, thus driving 
down wages. Overall, these findings reflect traditional employment segregation patterns 
whereby men and women sort into different job categories. 
 
Table 10. Gender Breakdown of Bids by Job Category 
 
   Category Name Female Male 
Software Development 10.32% 37.18% 
Multimedia and Design 45.25% 42.82% 
Writing and Translation 35.72% 10.19% 
IT Services 1.30% 5.70% 
Marketing and Sales 4.69% 2.84% 
Other categories 2.72% 1.26% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
Bids by female contractors are, on average, lower than bids by male contractors (Table 
11). This is partly explained by the fact that women are concentrated in job categories 




Table 11. Bid Amount (in EUR) by Gender 
 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Female $ 283.52 $ 134.89 $ 632.91 
Male $ 339.20 $ 194.33 $ 670.27 
Notes: Price calculations exclude projects nominated in Argentine pesos (posted by Argentine employers). 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
In fact, when bid amounts are broken down by gender and job category, the pattern is 
less clear (Table 12). While women bid lower in some of the largest job categories, they 
also tend to bid higher in male-dominated occupations such as IT services. We explore 
this question further in the next section. 
 
Table 12. Bid Amount by Gender and Job Category (in EUR) 
 
    Category All Men Women 
Multimedia and 
Design 
245.63 232.11 272.60 
(2,139.74) (1,047.49) (3,394.46) 
Web and Mobile 
Development 
433.95 440.11 400.05 
(1,427.46) (1,534.80) (536.50) 
Writing and 
Translation 
326.80 386.94 290.29 
(2,005.22) (3,136.92) (698.28) 
Marketing and Sales 
289.35 293.45 284,27 
(500.52) (548.24) (434.87) 
IT and 
Telecommunications 
760.65 715.74 1,013.20 
(4,368.61) (4,184.33) (5,302.54) 
Others 
291.66 307.98 273,26 
(411.80) (500.01) (281.96) 
    Notes: Price calculations exclude projects nominated in Argentine pesos 
(posted by Argentine employers). Projects that receive bids from either men 
or women only are also excluded. Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
Source: Author calculations based on Nubelo data. 
 
Lastly, we investigate whether gender differences in hiring are specific to the gender of 
the employer. Past research based on correspondence studies has found evidence of 
discrimination against women in male-dominated job categories and against men in 
female-dominated job categories (Altonji and Blank, 1999). More recently, lab and field 
experiments have reported similar findings (Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014; Reuben et al., 
2014). However, this literature has paid less attention to gender interactions, namely, to 
combinations between employer (male or female) and employee (male or female). 
 
To investigate gender interactions, we first assign gender to the employers in our dataset 
using a similar procedure employed for contractors. From the 47,469 observations 
(bids) in our original dataset, we were able to identify the gender of the employer 
associated with the job posting in 32,733 cases (69%). Limiting the dataset to these bids 




Interestingly, our results indicate that the overwhelming majority of employers are male 
(83%). When the sample is restricted to jobs posted by these male employers, we 
observe that male contractors win 70.90% of them. Recall that male contractors submit 
68% of all bids. The descriptive analysis thus suggests the presence of a very small 
hiring bias in favor of male contractors among male employers, which may be due to 
systematic differences between male and female contractors. We resume this analysis in 
the next section, introducing linear models that allow for controlling for observable 




4. MODEL ESTIMATES FOR HIRING LIKELIHOOD AND BIDS  
The descriptive results suggest that a number of factors are associated with employment 
opportunities in OCL platforms. The analysis by country indicates that domestic 
contractors are more likely to be hired than foreign contractors. We also observe that 
reputation and verifiable work experience in the platform are strongly associated with 
the likelihood of obtaining a contract. Most active contractors in Nubelo (i.e., those that 
have submitted at least one bid during the study period) have never been hired, which 
suggests that landing the first job is a key barrier to online employment. Lastly, the 
gender perspective reveals that women are less active than men in the platform, but 
have equal odds of being hired. Yet bids by female contractors are consistently lower, 
which suggests strategic behavior in anticipation of gender bias, particularly given that 
the majority of employers are male. 
 
In order to test these propositions, in this section we present a series of linear 
probability models. First, we estimate the probability of being hired as a function of 
three sets of variables. The first set captures the dynamics of price competition in the 
platform, and includes the bid amount (i.e., the price offered by the contractor) and the 
number of bids received by the project (which captures the intensity of competition for 
the project). The second set of covariates captures the contractor’s individual 
characteristics, including gender, profile information, work experience in the platform 
and country of residence. This set also includes a dummy for repeated interactions, 
namely, whether the employer has already hired the contractor for a previous job. The 
third factor captures average country reputation (as opposed to individual reputation). 
This is indicated by whether, at the time of bidding, the employer has ever hired another 
contractor from the same country of the bidding contractor. 
 
Feedback scores are not included in the models for two reasons: first, since only a small 
share of contractors have work experience in the platform, most bids in our dataset were 
made by contractors who have never received feedback; second, because, as noted, 
there is very little variance in feedback scores across experienced contractors (see 
Figure 5). As shown in the previous section, labor supply, wages and hiring dynamics 
vary significantly by job category. We therefore include controls for job sectors in order 
to account for this source of heterogeneity.
7
 Full description and summary statistics for 
each of the variables included in the models are presented in Appendix A. In all cases, 
marginal effects are interpreted at the dependent variable mean. 
 
Results for the first set of variables are as expected: the higher the contractor’s bid and 
the more intense the competition for the project, the lower the probability of being hired 
(Table 13). This result is consistent across all models presented (I-III). Next we turn to 
verifiable work experience in the platform. We introduce this covariate in two different 
ways: models I and II use a continuous variable (q) that quantifies the number of 
previous jobs in the platform at the time of biding, while model III uses a dummy (d) 
                                                        
7 Job categories were aggregated into four sectors as follows: Sector 1 includes software development and IT 
services. Sector 2 includes multimedia and design services. Sector 3 includes writing and translation services. Sector 
4 includes other professional services such as law, architecture, engineering, general business services and 
administrative support. Omitted category is Sector 1. Results do not vary when more disaggregated sectors are used. 
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that represents whether the contractor has any verifiable experience at the time of 
bidding. 
 
As expected, verifiable experience is a strong predictor of the likelihood of being hired. 
Yet as discussed above (see Figure 6), the marginal contribution of each additional 
project tends to diminish after the first project. This is indicated in models I and II, 
where we observe a negative (and significant) coefficient for the quadratic term of 
Experience. Further, the results in model III corroborate that landing the first job is a 
critical barrier for obtaining contracts in OCL platforms: all else equal, having any work 
experience at the time of bidding increases the likelihood of being hired by about 59%. 
 
Given the limited amount of information about contractors available to employers in the 
platform, even small changes in worker’s online profiles have a strong effect on the 
likelihood of being hired. This is suggested by the size of the coefficients associated 
with the amount of personal information available in contractors’ profiles in all models. 
Unfortunately, our dataset only quantifies the raw amount of information available, 
measured as a percentage of completed profile. Thus, beyond the general finding that 
more availability of personal information leads to more hiring, we are unable to 
determine what personal information is more valued by employers. 
 
The results corroborate that foreign contractors face a hiring penalty. Depending on the 
model, foreign contractors are between 15% (model III) and 28% (model I) less likely 
to be hired than domestic contractors. Another important finding is that the magnitude 
of the penalty depends on a) whether the employer has already hired the contractor in 
the past (repeated interactions), and b) whether the employer has previously hired a 
contractor from the same country of the bidding contractor (country reputation). When 
these two variables are introduced, the hiring penalty for a foreign contractor drops 
significantly, as indicated by the magnitude of the coefficient in model I (with no 
controls for repeated interactions or country reputation) vs. models II and III 
(controlling for repeated interactions and country reputation). Calculated at the 
dependent variable mean, the foreign contractor penalty drops from 28% in model I to 
19% in model II. 
 
This finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Mill, 2011), and suggests that 
discrimination against foreign contractors is statistical rather than taste-based. Statistical 
discrimination results from imperfect information about the distribution of worker’s 
skills (Aigner and Cain, 1977). Again, in OCL platforms employers have very limited 
information upon which hiring decision must be made. Lacking reliable information 
about worker’s abilities, employers use prior beliefs about how quality is distributed 
among contractors based, among other things, on country of origin. Since it is likely 
that employers are less certain about the distribution of quality among foreign than 
domestic contractors, a hiring penalty results. 
 
However, each new hiring produces new information about the quality of foreign 
contractors. It is also important to recall that most hiring in Nubelo results in positive 
matches, as evidenced by very high average feedback scores. Thus, as employers update 
their beliefs about the distribution of quality among foreign workers, the hiring penalty 
is reduced. It is interesting to note that this country reputation effect is a type of 
externality that affects all workers in OCL platforms regardless of their individual 
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reputation. This is a likely explanation for why workers from different countries and in 
different fields tend to cluster around different OCL platforms. 
 




I II III 
a. Price competition       
Bid Amount (log) -0.0119*** -0.0123*** -0.0123*** 
  (0.000998) (0.000921) (0.000921) 
Bids Received (q) -0.00165*** -0.00126*** -0.00125*** 
  (-5.17E-05) (-4.81E-05) (-4.81E-05) 
b. Freelancer Characteristics       
Experience (q) 0.0136*** 0.00758***   
  (0.000588) (0.000548)   
Experience Squared (q) -0.000258*** -0.000141***   
  (-1.67E-05) (-1.55E-05)   
Experience (d)     0.0428*** 
      (0.00281) 
% of Profile Completed (q) 0.0554*** 0.0533*** 0.0483*** 
  (0.00878) (0.0081) (0.00819) 
Different Country as Employer (d) -0.0206*** -0.0140*** -0.0113*** 
  (0.00272) (0.00259) (0.00259) 
Previous Experience with Employer (d)   0.709*** 0.715*** 
    (0.00973) (0.00968) 
c. Country reputation       
Previous Employer Experience with Country 
(d) 
  0.0398*** 0.0397*** 
  (0.00348) (0.00348) 
Job Category Controls YES YES YES 
Constant 0.160*** 0.128*** 0.113*** 
  (0.00981) (0.00912) (0.00893) 
Observations 34,132 34,132 34,132 
R-squared 0.086 0.223 0.223 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.073 0.073 0.073 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
 
Our next set of models estimates the amount of the bid submitted by the contractor. As 
shown, online employers are sensitive to pricing, and therefore correctly calibrating the 
amount of the bid is critical for obtaining contracts. Two significant findings emerge 
from the results presented in Table 14. First, more experienced contractors tend to bid 
lower. The magnitude of this effect is very significant: on average, experienced 
contractors are bidding about 25% below non-experienced contractors (model III). 
There are several plausible explanations for this finding. The most likely is that 
experienced contractors also depend more on income from OCL platforms, and thus 




Second, foreign contractors tend to submit lower bids. This result may be related to 
several factors. On the one hand, it is possible that foreign contractors are (correctly) 
anticipating a hiring penalty. Further, given that most employers are located in Spain, it 
is likely that non-Spanish contractors from less developed countries are willing to 
accept lower wages. The combined effect is significant: on average, bids submitted by 
foreign contractors are about 13% lower, even after controlling for individual 
characteristics and differences related to self-selection into various job categories. 
 
Table 14. Linear Estimation of Bid Amount (log) 
 
 
I II III 
a. Price competition       
Bids received (q) 0.00869*** 0.00884*** 0.00876*** 
  (0.000276) (0.000278) (0.000279) 
b. Freelancer Characteristics       
Experience (q) -0.0383*** -0.0384***   
  (0.00318) (0.00321)   
Experience Squared (q) 0.000601*** 0.000604***   
  (9.05E-05) (9.09E-05)   
Experience (d)     -0.246*** 
      (0.0165) 
Different Country as Employer 
(d) 
-0.137*** -0.115*** -0.130*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
Previous Experience with 
Employer (d) 
  -0.0647 -0.0916 
    (0.0572) (0.0569) 
% of Profile Completed (q) -0.579*** -0.574*** -0.538*** 
  (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0481) 
c. Country reputation       
Previous Employer Experience 
with Country (d) 
  0.122*** 0.122*** 
    (0.0204) (0.0204) 
Job Category Controls YES YES YES 
Constant 5.677*** 5.634*** 5.655*** 
  (0.0435) (0.0441) (0.0439) 
Observations 34,132 34,132 34,132 
R-squared 0.121 0.122 0.122 
Dependent Variable Mean 336.08 336.08 336.08 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.    
 
Lastly, we look at heterogeneous effects by gender. The descriptive analysis suggested 
that female contractors, despite having similar odds of being hired, tend to bid below 
male contractors. In broad terms, this result is aligned with recent studies that partly 
attribute the persistence of gender pay gaps to women being more risk averse (Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008), less competitive in labor environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
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2007), and less likely to negotiate their salary (Leibbrandt and List, forthcoming), all of 




To test this hypothesis, we replicate the models presented in Table 13 (hiring 
probability) and Table 14 (log of bid amount), adding a dummy variable for gender 
(female = 1). The number of observations is slightly smaller because, as noted, we were 
unable to establish gender for 8.30% of contractors. Given our interest in gender 
differences, we also drop projects that received bids from either male or female 
contractors only. In other words, only projects receiving bids from both male and 
female contractors are considered. 
 
The results corroborate that women do not face discrimination by employers in Nubelo. 
In fact, after controlling for bid amount and several other individual characteristics, 
female contractors are slightly more likely to be hired than male contractors (model I in 
Table 15). On the other hand, all else equal, bids submitted by female contractors are 
consistently lower (model II). The magnitude of the gender difference in bids, though 
relatively small (about 5%), is consistent with similar findings in previous studies (e.g., 
Säve-Söderbergh, 2007). 
 













Female (d) 0.0133*** -0.0471** 
 
 
  (0.00283) (0.0184) 
 
 
Constant 0.0833*** 5.534*** 
 
 
  (0.00938) (0.0505) 
 
 
Observations 26,461 26,461 
 
 
R-squared 0.154 0.134 
 
 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.052 4.7939 
 
 
Contractor Controls Yes Yes 
 
 
Job Category Controls Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Controls include: job category, log of 
bid amount (except in model II), total bids received by project, bid amount with respect to winning bid amount, work 
experience, previous employer experience with freelancer, if freelancer and employer are from the same country, if 
employer has previous experience with a freelancer from the same country, and percentage of profile completed. 
 
Further, we break down these results by employer gender. The goal is to determine, as 
the literature suggests, whether gender differences in attitudes towards competition and 
negotiation in labor environments vary depending on the gender of the employer and the 
gender composition of the group against which the individual worker competes (see 
Gneezy et al., 2003). Recall that, while the hiring process in Nubelo does not allow for 
direct interactions between employers and contractors (as in traditional labor markets), 
contractors can typically infer the gender of the employer through either the name or the 
                                                        
8 For a full discussion see Bertrand (2011). 
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picture associated with the job posting. In this analysis, we drop projects for which the 
gender of the employer could not be established. 
 
The results confirm that the dynamics of hiring and competition are also specific to 
different employer/contractor gender combinations (Table 16). First, we note that, all 
else equal, female contractors are more likely to be hired by both male and female 
employers. However the effect is significantly stronger when the employer is also 
female (model III). Specifically, while female contractors are 20% more likely to be 
hired by a male employer, they are 39% more likely to be hired (against a male 
contractor) when the employer is also female. 
 
The first effect runs contrary to common assumptions about male employers preferring 
male employees.
9
 Our results nonetheless suggest that the second effect is significantly 
stronger: in Nubelo, female employers tend to hire female contractors. This finding runs 
contrary to the so-called “queen-bee effect” hypothesis, which posits that women that 
achieve higher status in male dominated job categories tend to see other women as 
competitors, and thus discriminate against (potential) female co-workers (e.g., Dezső et 
al., forthcoming). 
 
The results for bid amounts are not entirely conclusive, but point in the direction of 
differentiated gender interactions. Specifically, women bid lower than men when 
confronted with a male employer, but their bids are statistically identical in jobs posted 
by female employers. A possible explanation is that they (incorrectly) anticipate 
discrimination by male employers, but (correctly) anticipate to be favored by female 
employers, thus closing the observed bid gap. This result is consistent with recent 
research which indicates that women ask for less but only when bargaining with men 
(Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri, 2015). Yet, more detailed research is needed to 
untangle the many factors affecting bargaining and bids under different gender 
interaction scenarios. 
  
                                                        
9 In reality the results from the empirical literature are inconclusive (see Blau and De Varo, 2006). 
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Table 16. Linear Probability of Hiring and Bid Amount by Employer Gender 
 
 








Log of Bid 
Amount (IV) 
Female contractor (d) 0.0103*** -0.0415* 0.0194*** 0.0192 
  (0.0038) (0.0242) (0.00719) (0.0451) 
Constant 0.0931*** 5.502*** 0.103*** 5.611*** 
   (0.0127) (0.0678) (0.0247) (0.123) 
Observations 14,987 14,987 3,575 3,575 
R-squared 0.164 0.116 0.187 0.194 






Contractor Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Category Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Controls include: job category, log 
of bid amount (except in models II and IV), total bids received by project, bid amount with respect to winning bid 
amount, work experience, previous employer experience with freelancer, if freelancer and employer are from the 
same country, if employer has previous experience with a freelancer from the same country, and percentage of 
profile completed. 
 
In our last model, we examine whether the gender of the employer affects the likelihood 
that a contractor will bid for that project. More specifically, we are interested in 
determining whether female contractors’ decisions to apply for a project are affected by 
the gender of the employer. Modeling a contractor’s decision to submit a bid (rather 
than the bid’s amount) requires a different set of controls. In this model we control for 
three sets of factors. The first captures project characteristics such as amount of the 
winning bid (a proxy for a project’s market value) and total bids received (a proxy for 
competition intensity). The second captures contractor’s characteristics such as 
experience and country of residence (i.e., domestic vs. foreign contractor). We also 
include a dummy that captures whether the contractor has previous experience with an 
employer from the same country of the employer posting the job. The third set controls 
for variations by job category. 
 
The results in Table 17 indicate that women are more likely to submit bids when the 
employer is also a women. However, the magnitude of the effect is significantly 
reduced as controls are introduced. Still, after controlling for project and contractor 
characteristics as well as job category, female contractors are about 5% more likely to 
submit a bid to a project posted by a female employer (calculated at the dependent 
variable mean). This partly explains why women are less active in Nubelo: because 
most employers are male, female contractors, who (correctly) believe they have a better 
chance of winning projects posted by female employers, tend to submit less bids than 
male contractors. 
 
It is interesting to note that the coefficient for project value (i.e., winning bid) is always 
negative, even when controlling for job categories in model IV. This suggests that 
women tend to bid for lower-value projects within each of the job categories. However 
the magnitude of the effect is small, and may be capturing unobserved preferences for 
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certain types of jobs or employers. Again, further research is needed to weed out 




Table 17. Linear Probability of Bid From Female Contractor 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Female 
employer (d) 
0.0601*** 0.0474*** 0.0411*** 0.0171** 
 
(0.00752) (0.00773) (0.00767) (0.00721) 
a. Project 
Characteristics     
Winning bid 
amount (log)  
-0.0339*** -0.0383*** -0.00834*** 
  
(0.00235) (0.00234) (0.00229) 
Bids received 
(q)   
0.00157*** 0.000710*** 
   
(0.000105) (0.000104) 
b. Freelancer 


















   
(0.0264) (0.0248) 
c. Country 







    (0.00998) (0.00938) 
Job Category 
Controls 
NO NO NO YES 
Constant 0.309*** 0.405*** 0.448*** 0.140*** 
   (0.00324) (0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0128) 
Observations 25,383 24,179 24,179 24,179 




0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 





The Internet is rapidly reshaping labor markets. This study contributes to our 
understanding of the dynamics of hiring and resulting wages in online labor markets. 
While many of the conventional results in the labor literature can be replicated in digital 
labor environments, online hiring and remote labor delivery introduce several 
peculiarities that need to be established and further studied. As discussed, OCL 
platforms offer numerous benefits, including reduced search costs and the decoupling of 
labor demand and supply from geographical constraints. Yet our findings highlight 
numerous frictions that partly mitigate the development benefits associated with digital 
labor. 
 
First, employers must make hiring decisions based on very limited information about 
the quality of contractors. This makes employers risk-averse, which results in a) 
statistical discrimination against foreign contractors (because there is likely to be more 
uncertainty about the distribution of quality among foreign workers), and b) high 
barriers to entry in OCL platforms. The first militates against workers in emerging 
markets, reducing opportunities to obtain higher-wage contracts from employers in 
more developed countries. The second is particularly unfavorable to younger workers, 
who are rapidly discouraged from participating in OCL platforms after failing to obtain 
contracts. 
 
On the other hand, our findings suggest that OCL platforms may be of particular benefit 
to women, for a variety of reasons. Despite changing social norms in many emerging 
regions, women still bear the brunt of housework and child care. As such, labor 
contracts that offer flexible hours and do not require commuting are particularly suited 
to female workers. Our results indicate that, all else equal, women have a small but 
statistically significant hiring advantage over men in Nubelo, particularly when the 
employer is also a women. However, our results confirm that differential gender 
attitudes towards bargaining and competition reduce wages for women in OCL 
platforms. Further, we notice that this effect is particularly relevant when female 
contractors bargain with male employers. 
 
A number of policy recommendations emerge from our findings. In broader terms, our 
results support investments in broadband infrastructure and ICT skills as a mechanism 
for expanding labor demand, particularly in areas where local job opportunities are 
limited by market size, transportation infrastructure deficits or overspecialization. 
Further, policy programs could encourage local firms or the government itself to hire 
inexperienced contractors through OCL platforms. As shown, the payoffs for landing 
the first job are large for individual contractors, but also help build country reputation, 
thus positively affecting other contractors (assuming positive feedback). Lastly, 
governments may provide specific training to women and young workers that focuses 
on reputation-building, bargaining strategies and other mechanisms associated with 
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APPENDIX A : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variables  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
 Minimum  Maximum  Median  
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Experience with 






















       
            
Female 
Employer (d)  0.18  0.39  0  1  0  
            
Female 
Freelancer (d)  0.32  0.47  0  1  0  
            
Winning Bid 
Amount (q)  158.81  356.82  .01  27,894.99  70  




Country (d)  0.15  0.35  0  1  0  
















                      
Notes: Statistics based on sample used for OLS estimations. This sample includes only active projects and 
excludes employers from Argentina and projects in Argentinian pesos. Source: Author's calculations based  
on Nubelo data. 
 
